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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to examine the relationship between internal corporate governance
mechanisms and board performance in monitoring roles.
Design/methodology/approach – A survey questionnaire was used to gather data on board
performance, while annual reports were employed to gather data on internal corporate governance
mechanisms. Data for board performance were based on 112 directors who represent the companies.
Findings – Factor analysis extracted two dimensions of monitoring roles: management oversight
roles and performance evaluation roles. Non-independent non-executive directors and managerial
ownership were found to be positively related to both dimensions of monitoring roles, while the
multiple directorships of non-executive directors were negatively related to management oversight
roles.
Practical implications – The paper establishes the need for regulators to pay particular attention
to multiple directorships, which are commonly practiced in public listed companies. The contribution
of non-independent non-executive directors rather than independent directors in monitoring roles calls
for further research. Regulators need to emphasize the performance evaluation roles of the board of
directors (BOD), as much emphasis has been given to management oversight roles.
Originality/value – The study contributes to the literature concerning monitoring roles as it shows
that management oversight roles and performance evaluation roles are differentiated. The findings
provide an avenue for the contribution of non-independent non-executive directors and multiple
directorships in monitoring roles.
Keywords Non-independent non-executive directors, Managerial ownership, Multiple directorships,
Board performance, Monitoring roles, Boards of directors, Malaysia
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its
shareholders, and should facilitate effective monitoring (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development, 2003). Corporate governance mechanisms can be
categorized into two controlling mechanisms: internal and external. The key external
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controlling mechanisms are managerial labor markets, the market for corporate
control, debt, and concentrated shareholding by blockholders (Ali and Sanda, 2001).
Two important internal corporate governance mechanisms are the Board of Directors
(BOD) and directors’ shareholding. However, due to the weak market control in
emerging countries, internal corporate governance mechanisms play a vital role in the
corporate governance of emerging markets (Lei and Song, 2004). Internal corporate
governance mechanisms are considered to have influence on the decisions made by
managers (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). A firm’s ownership structure is also considered to
be the primary determinant of the extent of agency problems between controlling
insiders and outside investors.
Recent developments in the corporate governance literature highlight the concern
about the effectiveness of the roles played by the BOD. Having board conformance to
the governance structure does not necessarily ensure high board performance, as the
design of the internal mechanisms of a firm is based on a company’s need (Society of
Management Accountants of Canada, 2002; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). A focus on
board performance is required, as several studies concerning the relationship between
board performance and firm performance have shown a positive relationship (Brown,
2005; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Kula, 2005), which indicates the importance of the
BOD in providing effective board performance to ensure higher firm performance
(Chambers, 2002). It is expected that internal corporate governance mechanisms will
have some impact on the roles played by the board of directors (as a proxy of board
performance). Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to examine the influence
of internal corporate governance mechanisms on board performance in executing
monitoring roles in Malaysian public listed companies.
2. Review of the literature
2.1 Corporate governance in Malaysia
Efforts to improve corporate governance practices in public listed companies in
Malaysia were undertaken prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) Listing Requirements of 1994 required companies to
establish an audit committee. However, the emphasis on corporate governance
practices was only highlighted after the crisis with the introduction of the Malaysian
Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG Code) in 1999. The purpose of the code is to set
out principles and best practices concerning the structures and processes that
companies may use to achieve an optimal governance framework.
The MCCG Code requires public companies to adhere to the principles of the code
based on the varying circumstances of individual companies. The code became
effective for public listed companies after the revamp of the KLSE Listing
Requirements in 2001. Accordingly, public companies need to adhere to Chapter 15 of
Corporate Governance related to Directors, Audit Committee, Auditors and Corporate
Governance Disclosure.
The MCCG Code underwent revision in 2007, which among other amendments placed
importance on the process carried out by the nominating committee in evaluating the
members of the board (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2007). According to the Code,
the BOD should implement a process to be carried out annually for assessing the
effectiveness of the BOD, committees of the board, and the contribution of each




the nominating committee when recommending candidates for directorships. The
proposed criteria include skills, knowledge, expertise and experience; professionalism;
integrity; and the candidate’s ability to discharge such responsibilities.
2.2 Theoretical perspectives on the monitoring roles of board of directors
Board performance refers to the ability of directors to perform board roles (Wan and
Ong, 2005). According to Nicholson and Kiel (2004), an effective board is “one that can
successfully execute the role set required of it” (p. 453). The ability of the board to
execute these roles will determine how effectively the board governs the company.
Wan and Ong (2005) classified board roles into four dimensions:
(1) monitoring roles;
(2) strategic roles;
(3) service roles; and
(4) resource dependency roles.
However, in the current study, the focus is on the monitoring roles as these roles are
highly emphasized in Malaysia, as stated in the Companies Act 1965 and other
directives such as the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (Finance Committee on
Corporate Governance, 2001). In fact, the concentrated ownership in Malaysian public
listed companies requires the practice of effective monitoring roles to avoid the
expropriation of company assets by the majority shareholders at the expense of the
minority shareholders.
From a theoretical perspective, agency theory recognizes the imperfection of existing
governance structures in protecting shareholders’ interests and concerns with the
consequences from the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders ( Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency theory assumes that
the interests of managers are not necessarily aligned with the interests of shareholders.
The board of directors is considered to be an efficient mechanism for monitoring a firm’s
managers on behalf of its investors. Accordingly, the roles of the BOD are to maximize
shareholders’ wealth, reduce agency costs, select or dismiss the CEO, evaluate the CEO
and company performance, and also participate in the strategic decision process and
control. Table I provides the theoretical perspective and operationalization of the
monitoring roles of the BOD from the agency theory perspective.
Theory Agency theory
Board role The primary role of boards is to monitor actions of
agents (executives) to ensure their efficiency and to
protect the interests of the principals (owners)
Operational definition of boards’ role Maximizing shareholders’ wealth
Reducing agency cost
Selecting CEO and dismissing CEO
Evaluating CEO and company performance
Strategic decision making and control
Theoretical origins Economics and finance









In Malaysia, the laws relating to the roles and responsibilities of directors can be found
in the Companies Act 1965 and the Articles of Association. The Articles of Association
contain regulations for the internal management of a company’s affairs (Zainal Abidin,
2002). Detailed duties or responsibilities of directors are set out in Section (S) 122 to 141
of the Companies Act 1965. The duties can be classified into three, i.e. (1) fiduciary
duty; (2) duty of care, diligence and skill; and (3) statutory duties (Ernst & Young,
1992). Fiduciary duty (S.132) refers to the duty to act honestly in the best interest of the
company. Duty of care, diligence, and skill requires directors “to act with due care and
diligence in the discharge of their duties as expected of a similar person (having the
skill) in that position” (S.132 [1], p.146). Directors are also subject to statutory duty for
various disclosure obligations (S.131 and S. 135), such as disclosure of directors’
interests in the company and related company, and any changes in those interests.
Accordingly, fiduciary duty, duty of care, diligence and skill, and statutory duties are
related to monitoring roles.
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (Finance Committee on Corporate
Governance, 2001) outlines the principal responsibilities of the board of directors in
public listed companies, which are:
. to review and adopt a strategic plan for the company;
. to oversee the conduct of the company’s business to evaluate whether the
business is being managed properly;
. to identify principal risks and ensure the implementation of appropriate systems
to manage these risks;
. to undertake succession planning, including appointing, training, fixing
compensation, and replacing senior management (where applicable);
. to develop and implement an investor relations program or shareholder
communication policy for the company; and
. to review the adequacy and the integrity of the company’s internal control
systems and management information systems, including systems for
compliance with applicable laws, regulations, rules, directives and guidelines.
Most of the coverage of the principal responsibilities of BODs in the MCCG Code
emphasizes the monitoring roles (items 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6), except for item 1, which
concerns strategy roles. In fact the coverage in monitoring roles can be grouped into
two kinds of role:
(1) management oversight roles (items 3, 5 and 6); and
(2) performance evaluation roles (items 2 and 4).
Several empirical studies have made attempts to operationalize items in the monitoring
roles, such as the studies conducted by Wan and Ong (2005) and Brennan (2006). Wan
and Ong (2005) identified ten items to represent monitoring roles in studying the
influence of the board process on board performance. In their study, only one
dimension of monitoring roles was tested. The items were as follows:
(1) monitor top management in decision-making;
(2) evaluate performance of top executives;




(4) member formally evaluated by others;
(5) analyze budget allocation versus performance;
(6) require information showing progress;
(7) review performance against strategic plan;
(8) review financial information for important issues/trends;
(9) engage in succession planning for CEO; and
(10) engage in succession planning for top managers besides CEO.
Another study by Brennan (2006) summarized items to be considered as monitoring
roles based on findings from previous studies. Among the items identified were:
. setting the risk appetite of the organization;
. ensuring corporate survival;
. specifying lines of authority of the management and board;
. ensuring compliance with statutory and other regulations;
. reviewing social responsibilities;
. monitoring and evaluating management; and
. controlling operations.
It is noted that almost all the items used by Brennan (2006) emphasize management
oversight roles rather than performance evaluation roles. Brennan (2006) also argues
that none of the items ensure a positive effect on firm performance because exercising
tight control by the board may function as constraints on management and limit
managers to pursue shareholder value. The control mechanisms imposed with the
intention of reducing self-serving behavior of managers might improve the
accountability of the managers. However, at the same time the control mechanisms
might reduce the efficiency of management.
Based on the above discussion, the current study produces comprehensive items
that can be used to operationalize the concept of monitoring roles with the aim of
enhancing the roles of BOD and also determining the factors that may influence their
effectiveness.
2.3 Board of directors’ (BOD) attributes
The attributes of BOD used in this study are based on the recommendations by Zahra






The board composition refers to the board size and the mix of director types (insiders





(1) directors’ background (age, educational background, values, and experience);
and
(2) board personality.
Board structure refers to the dimensions of a board’s organization, which include the
type of committee, committee membership, flow of information, and board leadership.
Board process refers to the approach the board takes in making decisions.
The board attributes that have been studied most in the corporate governance
research are board composition and board structure. In management research,
however, the focus of the studies is to link the CEO or executive directors’ background
and personalities with the firm’s performance. The current study adopts all the board
attributes suggested by Zahra and Pearce (1989), i.e. board composition (board size and
director’s type), board characteristics (knowledge/experience: tenure and multiple
directorships), board structure (board leadership), and board process (frequency of
meetings or percentage of meetings attendance), which are expected to provide more
insights into the monitoring roles of boards of directors. The next part discusses the
hypothesis development for each board attribute and managerial ownership in relation
to board performance in the monitoring roles.
3. Literature review and development of hypotheses
3.1 Board size
Agency theory argues that smaller boards are more effective than larger boards in
monitoring managers ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, as the board size
increases, it may be difficult to reach timely decisions because of the existence of rival
factions and cliques that may slow proceedings. Thus, large boards are less likely to
function effectively because the CEOs have sufficient power to control operations and
decisions (Jensen, 1993). A board size of more than ten directors is considered excessive
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) and may have a negative effect on firm performance. Studies
on the monitoring roles of the BOD in earnings management have shown the
effectiveness of small boards (Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006). Previous
studies in relation to firm performance have also shown the effectiveness of small
board size (Yermack, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Mak and Li, 2001; Singh and
Davidson, 2003). Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H1. There is a negative relationship between board size and board performance in
monitoring roles.
3.2 Board leadership
Power plays a major role in strategic decision making and the board’s power is limited
compared to that of the CEO (Stiles, 2001) because the CEO has structural power and is
an expert in the firm’s operations compared to the outside directors. As the
management team is usually headed by the CEO or Managing Director, who is
responsible for the formulation of strategy (Van der Berghe and Baelden, 2005), having
CEO duality would provide better strategy roles. However, independent leadership is
expected to contribute to better monitoring of management and of strategy
implementation. Boards are less likely to exert control over management when they




Evidence concerning the relationship between CEO duality and earnings
management activities is mixed. Deachow et al. (1996), who examined the
relationship between earnings manipulation and weaknesses, showed that boards
with CEO duality practices and boards dominated by management are more likely to
manipulate earnings. However, Xie et al. (2003) found that CEO duality is negatively
related to earnings management activities. As CEOs determine the agenda for board
meetings and lead the discussion, having independent board leadership is critical as a
check and balance before proposals are approved. In addition, Mohd Saleh et al. (2005)
found that CEO duality firms are associated with earnings management activities and
suggested that independent board leadership would promote audit committee
effectiveness. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H2. There is a positive relationship between independent board leadership and
board performance in monitoring roles.
3.3 Board composition
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) suggest that the effectiveness of board monitoring
depends on the composition of the board, which refers to the composition of the outside
directors on the board. Outside directors play an important role in ensuring that a
company has an effective internal control system, which is carried out through their
involvement in an audit committee in which they have a direct contact with the internal
audit function and the external auditors.
Within the corporate governance structure, non-executive directors (NED) have an
important position to monitor the management and executive directors. NEDs are seen
as the check and balance mechanism to enhance a board’s effectiveness. NEDs are
expected to bring independence to the board and add to the diversity of skills and
expertise of the directors (Abdullah, 2004). The business advisory role of the outside
directors (non-executive directors; NEDs) on the BOD is vital. A special report on
non-executive directors by The Economist Intelligence Unit (2003) highlights a special
breed of non-executive directors who are non-independent – so-called “gray” or
affiliated directors. Apart from being non-executive, an affiliated director is usually an
ex-employee, related to the firm’s controlling family, an interlocking director, or a
professional with significant business or family ties with the firm (Klein, 1998). As
most of the gray or affiliated directors own significant shares in the companies, their
incentives to become involved and engaged in corporate governance are higher
(Roberts et al., 2005). In addition, since affiliated directors have a prior association with
the firm, they often have a deeper knowledge of the firm and its industry than
independent directors, and, thus, shareholders may feel that affiliated directors serve
them better than independent directors. To be effective in monitoring strategic
decisions, outside directors should be individuals from the business (CEO or executive
directors from other companies) with relevant knowledge and related expertise
(Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). Thus, the hypothesis is developed as follows:
H3. There is a positive relationship between non-executive directors (NED) and






Multiple directorships refer to the number of external appointments held by corporate
directors (Ferris et al., 2003). Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) define multiple directorships as
directors sitting on more than one board. Directors with more multiple directorships
are expected to have more exposure to certain tasks and procedures that can be
implemented in another company, making board performance more effective because
fewer transaction costs are incurred (Beasley, 1996; Mohd Saleh et al., 2005; Sarkar and
Sarkar, 2009). They are expected to provide effective monitoring. Directors who have
experience in related strategies are expected to be more capable of contributing to the
strategic decision process (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001).
In the USA, it is often considered best practice for a director to hold less than three
multiple directorships. “Busy directors” are defined as directors holding three or more
directorships (Ferris et al., 2003; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2009). According to the “busyness
hypotheses”, if directors have too many board assignments, their time and attention
might be dissipated, and thus undermine their ability to discharge their roles.
In Malaysia, multiple directorships are found to be common among listed firms in
Malaysia (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). This practice is due to the high number of
directorships allowed to directors. According to the KLSE Listing Requirements, BODs
are allowed to have a maximum of ten directorships in public listed companies and 15
directorships in non-listed companies.
Following the “busyness hypotheses”, directors with multiple directorships may
have less time to scrutinize the internal control system closely, which lead to less
effectiveness in monitoring managers. Thus, directors will put more reliance on the
work of the internal audit (Fadzil et al., 2005). It is hypothesized that:
H4. There is a negative relationship between multiple directorships and board
performance in monitoring roles.
3.5 Board knowledge
Lorsch (1995) acknowledges that the board’s ability to govern also depends on the
knowledge of directors, which comes from their working experience. Fairchild and Li
(2005) found that board knowledge in terms of directors’ age and tenure had a positive
relation to firm performance. Peasnell et al. (2001) found that the tenure of
non-executive directors is negatively associated with the level of earnings of
management activities, which indicates the importance of board tenure in performing
effective monitoring roles. This suggests that NEDs with longer tenure have more
knowledge about companies’ operations, which assists them in overseeing
management activities. However, longer board tenure may also result in declining
performance due to impediments such as increased social cohesion between the CEO
and board members and decreased innovation adaption (Bantel and Jackson, 1989;
Westphal, 1999). Thus, the hypothesis is as follows:
H5. There is a relationship between the board tenure of non-executive directors
and board performance in monitoring roles.
3.6 Board process
The board process refers to the decision-making activities of the board (Kula, 2005). It




by the frequency of board meetings, as all major issues and decisions are discussed and
made at formal board meetings (Vafeas, 1999). More board committee meetings are
required to focus on specific issues, especially when companies are performing poorly
and require restructuring. Another measure of board process is to use the percentage of
the meetings attended by the BOD. A high percentage of attendance would provide
knowledge to directors about the business operations and contribute to monitoring the
strategy implementation. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
H6. There is a positive relationship between board process and board
performance in monitoring roles.
3.7 Managerial ownership
Shareholding in Malaysian PLCs is highly concentrated in the hands of a few
shareholders (La-Porta et al., 2000; Abdul Samad, 2002). Abdul Samad (2002) reported
that the mean of the first largest shareholding was 30.30 percent and that of the five
largest shareholdings was 58.84 percent, which accounted for more than half of the
voting shares. About 71.4 percent of companies (Main Board and Second Board) were
under majority ownership, having a shareholding of more than 50 percent, and were
controlled by their five largest shareholders. The significant means of enhancing
control in Malaysia is through pyramid-holding, cross-holding and managerial
ownership (Claessens et al., 2000). There is also a significant participation of owners in
management, with 33 percent involved in management (Kuala Lumpur Stock
Exchange and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999).
Managerial ownership (MOWN) works as a direct incentive for managers to act in
line with shareholders’ interests ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, the greater
the percentage of stocks owned by top managers, the more likely it is that managers will
make decisions consistent with maximizing shareholders’ wealth. High MOWN is
expected to lead managers to maximize firm’s wealth as the net effects will ultimately go
to them. Ownership concentration by managers is a factor that has an impact on the
monitoring potential of BODs (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). The presence of controlling
shareholders has been found to be associated with positive firm performance in
Thailand (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Companies with concentrated ownership might
also be subjected to high monitoring activities, as the tendency for entrenchment is
higher (Morck et al., 1988; Mat Nor et al., 1999; Ali and Sanda, 2001). It is hypothesized
that:
H7. There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership (MOWN) and
board performance in monitoring roles.
In the present study, firm size was considered a control variable as board performance
may be affected directly or indirectly by factors related to the nature of the firm (Abdul
Samad, 2002; Chee and Md Taib, 2005; Wiwattanakantang, 2001). Controlling for size
is also necessary, as the percentage of managerial shareholding may be larger in small
firms due to the small outlay required in small firms.
4. Research method
4.1 Population and data collection
The unit of analysis of this study is the company, and the BOD was taken to represent





Bursa Malaysia for the year 2006. Only the main board companies were selected in order
to control for other factors that might influence the performance of companies on other
boards, such as size differences and risks. As the population of companies listed on the
main board in 2006 was around 520 (excluding finance companies, PN4, PN17,
companies listed after 2004), the sample size was determined in line with Roscoe’s (1975)
recommendation – to have preferably one to ten (or more) for each variable tested for
multivariate regression analysis. Thus, the study required a minimum sample size of 90.
A survey method was used to collect data on board performance from the BODs.
Bearing in mind the poor response rate generally obtained in survey studies conducted
in Malaysia, which is about 10 percent to 20 percent, questionnaires were sent to all 520
companies. Only BOD members were permitted to answer the survey questionnaire as
the company’s representative. To increase the response rate, follow-up letters were sent
to non-respondents.
Data for board attributes, managerial ownership, and financial information were
collected from companies’ annual reports (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, 2006).
4.2 Construction of questionnaire
The board performance in monitoring roles measures the extent of BOD participation
or involvement in the monitoring functions. Items in the questionnaires related to the
monitoring roles were adapted from Brennan (2006), Finance Committee on Corporate
Governance (2001), and Wan and Ong (2005). Most items were adapted from Wan and
Ong, except the item “evaluate the skill mix on the board”, which was taken from the
MCCG Code. The items “ensure corporate survival”, “specify lines of authority of
management and board”, and “review social responsibilities of the company” were
from Brennan (2006). Eleven items were considered to represent the monitoring roles.
In constructing the questionnaire, the content validity of the instrument was
assessed based on the literature review and a pre-test study of the BODs and senior
academics. In the actual survey, the BOD was required to indicate the extent of
participation or involvement in the board roles of the company for the financial year
2006 using a five-point scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 5 (very much). See Appendix
1 for the monitoring items used in this study.
4.3 Data analysis
For board performance in monitoring roles, factor analysis was conducted to determine
the clusters of items fitting into the board performance dimension. Reliability analysis
was also run to determine the internal consistency (Cronbach’s a) of items in a variable
(Hair et al., 2006). Regression analysis was conducted to examine the relationship
between internal corporate governance mechanisms and each of the monitoring role
dimensions. The regression function is as follows:
BP ¼ b0 þ b1ðBSIZEÞ þ b2ðBLEADÞ þ b3ðBCOMÞ þ b4ðMMDIRÞ þ b5ðTENÞ
þ b6ðBPROSÞ þ b7ðMOWNÞ þ b8ðLGTAÞ þ 1;
where BP is the board performance dimensions in monitoring roles, BSIZE is the number
of board members, BLEAD is board leadership (dummy 1 for CEO – Chairman, and 0
otherwise), BCOM is the board composition, the proportion of independent directors to




non-executive directors to board size (NED), MMDIR is the directorships per
non-executive director, TEN is the average of non-executive directors’ tenure, BPROS is
the frequency of board meetings (FMEET) or percentage of directors’ meeting
attendance (PMEET), MOWN is the percentage of executive directors’ shareholdings
(direct and indirect shareholding), and LGTA is the logarithm of total assets.
Previous studies seem to consider NEDs as independent directors, and sometimes
they are used interchangeably. For the current study, we differentiated NEDs into
independent directors and non-independent non-executive directors to identify the
impact of each on the monitoring roles. At the same time, we also considered NEDs as a
whole (both independent and non-independent), and this has been used in previous
studies (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Weir et al. 2002).
5. Results and discussion
5.1 Sample profile
Out of 520 questionnaires sent, only 112 were usable, which represents a response rate
of 21.54 percent. With respect to sector, almost all sectors (industries) are covered in
this study. Table II shows the profile of respondents in the study. For the composition
of respondents, CEO/Managing Director represents the highest frequency of 36 (32.14
percent), followed by executive director with 30 (26.79 percent). The non-executive
directors, comprising independent directors and non-independent non-executive
directors were 24 (21.43 percent). Eleven (9.82 percent) company secretaries
participated in the study. Responses from the company secretaries were also




CEO/Managing director (MD) 36 32.14
Executive director (ED)a 30 26.79
Non-executive director (NED)b 24 21.43
Company secretary (CS) 11 9.82
Director type
Executive director (ED) 68 60.71
Independent director (INE) 20 17.86
Non-independent non-executive director (NINE) 13 11.61
Industry type
Consumer product (CP) 9 8.00
Industrial product (IP) 28 25.00
Trading and services (TS) 28 25.00
Technology (TECH) 3 2.70
Infrastructure (INFRA) 1 0.90
Construction (CONST) 17 15.20
Property (PROP) 15 13.40
Plantation (PLT) 11 9.80










Abidin, 2002). In total, based on the type of director, 60.71 percent of the respondents
represent the executive directors, while 29.47 percent were non-executive directors.
The response bias analysis (t-test) for the dimensions of monitoring roles data was
conducted for two groups of respondents to examine the homogeneity of samples. The
first group is early (n ¼ 63) versus late (n ¼ 49) responses. Late responses refer to
responses received after the follow-ups were done. The second group is non-executive
directors (n ¼ 33) versus executive directors or other responses (n ¼ 79). The results
show no significant difference between early and late responses for the dimension of
monitoring roles, as shown by the insignificant t-value of each factor (MONITOR1
(t ¼ 20:839), MONITOR2 (t ¼ 0:099)). The result for the second group also shows no
significant difference between non-executive directors’ and executive directors’
responses (MONITOR1 (t ¼ 0:973), MONITOR2 (t ¼ 0:551)). Thus, the response bias
is not considered a significant issue in this study.
5.2 Board performance of monitoring roles
Results from the factor analysis extracted two dimensions of monitoring roles. These
are named management oversight roles (MONITOR1) and performance evaluation
roles (MONITOR2). Details of items in each factor are given in Appendix 2. The finding
is somewhat different from that of Wan and Ong (2005) because they only managed to
identify one dimension of monitoring roles. The difference may be due to the
instruments used to capture board performance items.
5.3 Descriptive statistics of variables
Based on the common definition of board leadership (BLEAD), Table III shows that
about 83.9 percent of the sample companies have different persons acting as the
CEO/MD and the chairman of the companies. Even though the MCCG Code
recommends that companies have independent leadership, some companies (about 16.1
percent) still choose a combined leadership structure.
Table IV reports the descriptive statistics of continuous variables. The average board
size (BSIZE) is 7.66 with a minimum of four directors and maximum of 13 directors. The
board size of the sample companies in this study is not much different from that in the
study by Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999) of eight
directors. On average, the companies have a higher proportion of independent directors
(0.42), meaning that one third of the directors or two members should be independent
directors (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 2001). The average proportion
of non-independent non-executive directors (NINE) in a company is 0.24 (which is about
two directors). The proportion of NINE in this study is quite low compared to that in the
study by Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and PricewaterhouseCoopers (1999), which
found an average of three NINE in a public listed company.
BLEAD Frequency Percentage
CEO ¼ Chairman (0) 18 16.1
CEO – Chairman (1) 94 83.9







The frequency of meetings (FMEET) conducted is about 5.79 times per year with a
minimum of four times to a maximum of 15 times. The percentage of attendance in
meeting of directors (PMEET) is quite high with an average of 93.70 percent. By
company, the average tenure (TEN) of non-executive directors serving on the board is
about 6.78 years with a minimum period of 1.33 years and a maximum period of 18
years. For multiple directorships (PMDIR), on average, more than 50 percent of the
non-executive directors in a company have at least one additional directorship in other
PLCs. Multiple directorships per non-executive director (MMDIR) in a company are
1.73 with a maximum of 6.50. Individually, the maximum multiple directorships held
by directors reached the maximum limit of ten directorships in PLCs. Some of them
even have additional directorships in non-public listed companies, societies and
government agencies. For managerial ownership (MOWN), on average, executive
directors hold 23.80 percent shareholdings. For board performance, on average, the
means are more than 3.00 with MONITOR1 (management oversight roles) having
higher scores than MONITOR2 (performance evaluation roles).
5.4 Correlations among variables
Table V reports the correlations among the variables of the study. In general, most
correlations are less than 0.80, except for the correlation between the non-independent
non-executive directors (NINE) and the non-executive directors (NED). Board size
(BSIZE) is found to be positively correlated with firm size (LGTA) and the proportion
of non-independent non-executive directors (NINE). However, board size is negatively
correlated with the percentage of attendance at meetings (PMEET) and the proportion
of independent directors (INE). This means that companies with a larger board size
tend to have a lower percentage of board attendance at meetings and independent
directors.
For board leadership (BLEAD), there is a positive correlation between board
leadership and the proportion of non-independent non-executive directors (NINE) and
the percentage of attendance at meetings (PMEET). A negative correlation is found
between board leadership and managerial ownership (MOWN). This suggests that
companies with independent leadership tend to have a higher proportion of
Variables Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum
BSIZE 7.66 1.79 0.47 20.22 4 13
INE 0.42 0.11 1.01 0.97 0.30 0.83
NINE 0.24 0.18 0.27 20.93 0.00 0.67
NED 0.66 0.19 20.04 21.13 0.30 1.00
FMEET 5.79 2.20 1.90 4.15 4 15
PMEET (percent) 93.70 5.48 21.15 1.35 75.00 100.00
TEN (years) 6.78 3.54 0.94 0.91 1.33 18.00
PMDIR (percent) 56.79 31.22 20.18 21.00 0.00 100.00
MMDIR 1.73 1.34 0.91 0.58 0.00 6.50
MOWN (percent) 23.80 23.06 0.34 21.32 0.00 79.10
MONITOR1 4.11 0.61 20.38 20.18 2.33 5.00
MONITOR2 3.74 0.80 20.53 20.12 1.50 5.00
LGTA 20.40 1.25 0.70 0.26 17.93 24.46









































































































































































































































































































































































































non-independent non-executive directors (NINE) and a higher percentage of meeting
attendance (PMEET), but a lower percentage of managerial ownership (MOWN).
The proportion of non-independent non-executive directors (NINE) is found to be
negatively correlated with managerial ownership (MOWN). Smaller companies tend to
have higher managerial ownership (MOWN), while larger companies tend to have more
management oversight roles (MONITOR1). Companies with lower proportion of
independent directors (INE) and a higher percentage of managerial ownership (MOWN)
tend to have greater involvement in performance evaluation roles (MONITOR2).
Directors with multiple directorships are more attached to larger companies, and
independent directors are more inclined to have higher multiple directorships.
5.5 Multiple regression between internal corporate governance and monitoring roles
Table VI shows the results of multiple regression analysis between internal corporate
governance and management oversight roles (MONITOR1). In Model 1, using NED as
the measure of board composition, the results indicate that multiple directorship is
negatively related to management oversight roles (p , 0:10). In Model 2, using NINE
as the measure of board composition, the results show that management oversight
roles are positive and significantly related to the proportion of NINE (p , 0:10) and
managerial ownership (p , .10). Similar to Model 1, multiple directorships are found to
be negatively related to management oversight roles. Regression analysis using
independent directors as the measure of board composition shows that none of the
corporate governance mechanisms is significant (R 2 ¼ 13:01 percent, F ¼ 2:56,
p ¼ 0:014; results not shown in the text). For the control variable, it is found that larger
companies are associated with higher management oversight roles in all models.
The results signify the importance of having non-independent non-executive
directors (NINE) to undertake greater management oversight roles. Because they may
have significant interests in the company, they need to make sure that management
carries out their roles according to specific contracts. The insignificant relationship
Model 1 Model 2
B t-value B t-value
Constant 1.766 1.30 1.689 1.29
LGTA 0.142 3.06 * * * 0.147 3.22 * * *
BSIZE 0.001 20.02 20.010 20.30
BLEAD 20.116 20.80 20.150 21.04
NED 0.282 0.79
NINE 0.687 1.97 *
PMEET 20.444 20.44 20.402 20.40
LGTEN 20.120 20.54 20.110 20.48
MMDIR 20.078 21.89 * 20.076 21.88 *
MOWN 0.371 1.29 0.540 1.97 *
R 2 0.113 0.140
F-statistics 1.64 2.09
Significance of F-statistics 0.124 0.043
n 112 112











between independent directors and management oversight roles is not in line with the
corporate governance literature on the positive effect of independent directors on
enhancing the monitoring roles. This result is consistent with previous studies, which
found that independent directors are not significantly or negatively related to firm
performance (Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 1999).
The significant relationship with managerial ownership (MOWN) suggests that
when managers hold a higher percentage of ownership in a company, greater
management oversight roles are conducted to protect managers’ interests, as a higher
percentage of ownership would align managers’ interests with the shareholders’
interests. The results are consistent with the results of Bhagat and Black (1999) and
Wiwattanakantang (2001). The negative relationship of multiple directorships with
management oversight roles suggests that non-executive directors with multiple
directorships lead to less activities being conducted to monitor management. This
result is consistent with the “busyness hypotheses”.
For the relationship between internal corporate governance and the evaluation of
managers’ performance (MONITOR2), the result in Table VII shows that the
proportion of non-independent non-executive directors (NINE) is positively related to
MONITOR2 (p , 0:01) in Model 2. However, independent directors are found to be
negatively related to MONITOR2 (p , 0:05) in Model 1. The result may be due to less
involvement of independent directors in evaluating the performance of managers.
Managerial ownership (MOWN) is found to be significant and positively associated
with MONITOR2 in both models. Other variables are not significantly related to
MONITOR2.
6. Conclusion
The results of the study indicate the different impact of internal corporate governance
mechanisms on each dimension of monitoring roles. For the management oversight
Model 1 Model 2
B t-value B t-value
Constant 2.586 1.61 1.450 0.92
LGTA 0.111 1.57 0.107 1.47
BSIZE 0.003 0.06 0.010 0.17
BLEAD 20.142 20.78 20.149 20.83
INE 21.663 22.31 * *
NINE 1.321 2.85 * * *
PMEET 20.297 20.22 20.264 20.20
LGTEN 20.021 21.04 20.013 20.66
MMDIR 20.193 20.25 20.055 20.74
MOWN 0.599 2.07 * * 1.245 4.05 * * *
R 2 0.111 0.120
F-statistics 2.11 3.35
Significance of F-statistics 0.041 0.002
n 112 112










roles, H3, H4 and H7 are supported. For the performance evaluation roles, H3 and H7
are supported. The study highlights some internal corporate governance mechanisms
(non-independent non-executive directors and managerial ownership), which are found
to be significantly related to the extent of the roles conducted in both dimensions of
monitoring functions. The results support the importance of having non-independent
non-executive directors as effective monitoring mechanisms. This finding suggests
that non-independent non-executive directors have relevant incentives (represent
blockholders and/or have significant shareholdings in the company) to monitor
management decisions and evaluate management performance. The positive
relationship of non-independent non-executive directors supports the argument by
Klein (1998) and Roberts et al. (2005) in terms of the possibility of the increased
involvement of non-independent non-executive directors in monitoring management.
The negative and significant relationship between independent directors and
performance evaluation roles has some implications for the policy makers and
regulators to improve corporate governance. Attention should be given to the roles of
independent directors to increase their involvement in performance evaluation roles.
The significant relationship between managerial ownership and monitoring roles
supports the role of managerial ownership as an effective mechanism to align
managers’ decisions with shareholders’ interests. The negative relationship between
multiple directorships and monitoring roles has some implications for the current
practices of allowing directors to hold up to ten directorships in public listed
companies. Multiple directorships are found to have a negative impact on the
management oversight roles; however, they have no influence on the performance
evaluation roles of BOD. The study also shows that board size, board knowledge
(based on board tenure), and frequency of board meetings do not influence the
execution of monitoring roles by the BOD. The insignificance of board size is not
consistent with agency theory that a small board is considered to be an effective board.
The insignificant findings for board knowledge as measured by board tenure and
board process as measured by the frequency of board meetings may indicate that
neither variable matters in the execution of monitoring roles by the BOD. However, the
findings may also indicate that the measurement used may not really represent the
variables. Thus, future studies should consider other proxies to further research the
impact of these variables on the monitoring roles of the BOD.
The main limitation of the study is that the sample of the study only focuses on the
main boards of companies. Thus, the findings of the study may not be generalized to
other boards. Further research should be conducted on other boards to determine
whether the survey instruments for monitoring roles hold for other boards. The other
limitation is the low R 2 in both models. However, the fact that the models are
significant at 5 percent when NINE is used in the models indeed indicates that the
findings from this study are still relevant.
Further research should be conducted on multiple directorships, as limited
knowledge is available concerning the status of multiple directorships in Malaysia,
such as determining the optimum multiple directorships for each type of directors.
Another area of concern that requires further attention is the performance evaluation
roles of the board of directors. This is in line with the revised code of the corporate
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Ensure compliance with statutory and other
regulations 0.784 20.054
Review company performance against strategic plan 0.784 0.235
Require information of company performance
showing progress 0.734 0.266
Specify lines of authority of management and board 0.671 0.405
Ensure corporate survival 0.660 0.383
Monitor top management in decision making 0.636 0.404
MONITOR2 (four items)
Have internal mechanisms to evaluate board
members’ performance yearly 0.110 0.824
Evaluate the skill mix on the board 0.222 0.805
Evaluate performance of top company executives 0.252 0.787
Involve in succession planning for top management 0.332 0.771
Eigenvalue 5.06 1.38
Percentage variance explained 50.63 13.75
Cronbach’s a 0.86 0.85
Notes: The KMO is 0.855, with Bartlett’s test of sphericity being significant at 0.000. The actual
questionnaire had 11 items. However, factor analysis and reliability analysis identified only ten items
fitting into the two factors. Italicised loadings indicate the inclusion of that item in the factor
Table AI.
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